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Logical Theatrics, or Floes on Flows
Translating Quine with the Shins
Joshua M. Hall
“Casting ourselves thus in unreal roles, we do not
generally know how much reality to hold constant.
Quandaries arise. But despite them we find
ourselvesattributing beliefs, wishes, and strivings
even to creatures lacking the power of speech, such
is our dramatic virtuosity.” Quine
1 I will begin this comparative analysis with Quine, focusing on the front matter and first
chapter of Word and Object (alongside From a Logical  Point of  View and two other short
pieces), attempting to illuminate there a (1) basis of excessive, yet familiar, chaos, (2)
method  of  improvised,  dramatic  distortion,  and  (3)  consequent  neo-Pragmatist
metaphysics. Having elaborated this Quinian basis, method and metaphysics, I will then
show that they can be productively translated into James Mercer’s poetic lyrics for The
Shins, with an emphasis on the first song, entitled “Caring is Creepy,” from their debut
studio  album,  Oh,  Inverted  World! Finally,  I  will  explain  why  Quine  and  Mercer  are
particularly  suited  to  this  translation  (in  contrast  to  other  philosophically-rich  pop
lyricists such as Bob Dylan, and other pragmatist philosophers like Robert Brandom), in
the course of which important implications will emerge for our globalized world today.1 
2 Before  I  begin,  however,  it  might  be  helpful  to  clarify  what  I  mean by  “Pragmatist
metaphysics.” I would argue that there are, at most, Wittgensteinian family resemblances
among  the  metaphysical  positions  adopted  by  philosophers  who  self-identify  as
Pragmatist.  Consequently,  the  best  one  can  do,  arguably,  is  to  arrange  these family
members around one or more family traits or characteristics. Following William Myers, I
have  chosen  to  focus  on  the  characteristic  of  an  emphasis  on  process  rather  than
substance in metaphysics.2 Using this emphasis as the basis or axis for a spectrum of
Pragmatist metaphysical views, from maximally fluid conceptions such as James’ radical
empiricism to rigidly solid frameworks such as Putnam’s internal realism, I would suggest
that Quine occupies the moderate middle position on this spectrum. 
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3 More precisely, at the boundary marker on the left side of this spectrum – representing
maximal  substantiality – would be any metaphysical  position that posits  any kind of
thing-like substance (whether physical, mental, or otherwise) as the sole foundation of
reality to which all else reduces. Anything in that area would be too static to qualify as a
pragmatist metaphysics in my sense. And at the boundary maker on the right side of this
spectrum – representing maximal fluidity – would be any explicitly anti-metaphysical
position  (such  as  Heraclitus’  flux),  or  the  rejection/abandonment  of  the  question  of
metaphysics altogether (such as Derrida’s “closure” of metaphysics).  Anything in this
latter area would be insufficiently metaphysical  to quality.  But in between these two
boundary markers, starting from the most fluid pragmatist point on this continuum, and
in order of increasing static-ness (moving leftward), I would order some of the major
Pragmatists  and  neo-Pragmatists  as  follows:  (1)  Rorty’s  featureless  conversation,  (2)
James’ stream of self-consciousness, (3) Dewey’s qualified experience, (4) Mead’s gestures,
(5) Quine’s posited entities, (6) Peirce’s end of inquiry, (7) Putnam’s internal realism, (8)
and Brandom’s inferential semantics, to (9) Habermas’ conversation about “how things
are.” With this clarification of my use of the phrase “Pragmatist metaphysics” in mind, I
now turn to my detailed analyses of Quine.
 
I. [Distorted] Word and [Indeterminate] Object
4 I will first consider the text of Word and Object, specifically the opening quote, the preface 
and the first chapter, the latter of which serves as a first pass over the subject matter of
the text as a whole.  The book opens with a quote from biologist  James Grier Miller,
“Ontology recapitulates philology.”  In other words,  metaphysics  repeats  logic,  or  the
discourse  of  beings  rehearses,  re-stages,  re-produces  (in  the  sense  of  a  theater
production) the love of discourse. To the question as to which came first, the event or the
story – the world or art – Quine thus appears to side (via Miller) with the story and art.
Thus is the stage set, the scenery in place, the actors at first position for the entirety of
the book, beginning with the preface.
5 “Language,” writes Quine (1960: ix), “is a social art.” Quine the scientist, lover of logic,
thus begins the introduction to his book of scientific philosophy by defining language as a
kind  of  –  not  science  –  but  art.  He  explicates  this  claim  as  follows:  “there  is  no
justification for collating linguistic meanings, unless in terms of men’s dispositions to
respond overtly to socially observable stimulations” (Quine 1960: ix). One is (only?) privy
to what happens on stage – on this stage on which one sits, stands or lies listless – and
these happenings are constituted by the movements of the actors’ bodies (including the
movements of lips, teeth, tongue, larynx, lungs, etc. for speech). If there is a behind-the-
scenes, and for Quine we always and continue to assume that there is, then we can say
nothing  intelligent  about  it.  This  idea  is  what  I  am calling  a  basis  of  excessive,  yet
familiar, chaos. Or, zooming out to the level of Pragmatist metaphysical systems, this
basis is the ocean water that flows beneath the floe of ice-solid formal discourse.
6 Consequent upon this lack of a firm foundation for one’s behavioral responses to the
other  actors’  behavior,  all  analysis  reveals  itself  as  interpretation,  criticism,  and
improvisation – a poetic distortion sans pre-distorted reality. Put differently, every act of
interpretation constitutes  a  translation (not  attempted,  for  there  are  no attempts  at
translation,  just  good  or  bad  translations)  of  (observable)  behavior  into  (analytical)
behavior, of theory-bound praxis into practically-bent theory. This includes translating
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another  actor’s  sonic  emissions  into  a  meaningful  speech  pattern  (or,  with  George
Herbert Mead, one’s own movement into a meaningful gesture). As an actor, one merely
behaves;  as  an observer  of  other  actors  (including observing oneself  qua actor),  one
creates,  improvising  theories  to  explain  their  behavior.  This  method,  based  on  the
excessive yet familiar chaos, is what I am calling improvised, dramatic distortion. Or, at
the level of Pragmatist metaphysical system, this method is the ability of the ice floe to
float in any direction whatsoever on its flowing basis.
7 Referring back to this flowing, chaotic basis underneath his method, Quine (1960:  ix)
notes that, “the enterprise of translation is found to be involved in a certain systematic
indeterminacy.” Note that  the last  two words,  as  a phrase,  amount to an oxymoron,
because it is generally agreed that (a) what it is to be a system is to be determinate, and
(b) to be systematic is to have thoroughly elaborated a collection of principles, rules,
positions,  axioms,  etc.  Translation for  Quine,  however,  is  not  only  an  indeterminate
business, it is fundamentally, pervasively, even systematically indeterminate. For Quine,
it is essential to the structure of translation, because essential to the structure of that
which is translated, that it lacks any essential structure.
8 In light of these insights from Quine’s Preface, one could legitimately reformulate the
opening quote from Miller as follows: ontology recapitulates an abyssal indeterminacy
shot  through  with  improvised  lines  of  translation.  To  summarize,  (a)  all  that  exists
mirrors the flimsy structure of language; (b) reality, like language, is essentially chaotic
and  only  secondarily,  semi-arbitrarily  ordered;  (c)  the  world  presents  itself  as
undetermined, excessive and vulnerable to creative renderings; and (d) these creative
renderings, which are parts acted out on the stage, since they have, quite literally, no
basis “to speak of,” are nothing other than that world itself; therefore (e) in actuality,
there are no poetic variations of a prosaic substructure – there are only poetic originals.
9 At this point, I would like to return to my opening quote from Quine. Its original context
is a discussion of what is,  for Quite,  the seemingly inevitability fictive and imaginary
nature of propositional attitudes, but it can also be applied to the broader issues that I
have been considering:
Casting our real selves thus in unreal roles, we do not generally know how much
reality  to  hold  constant.  Quandaries  arise.  But  despite  them  we  find  ourselves
attributing beliefs,  wishes,  and strivings even to creatures lacking the power of
speech, such is our dramatic virtuosity. (Quine 1960: 219)
10 With the phrases “real selves” and “unreal roles,” Quine is referring to his position that
propositional attitudes are simply the projection by a speaker of what s/he imagines s/he
would feel in response to a certain stimulus, onto a third person who has just experienced
that stimulus. For present purposes, however, I wish to focus on the last phrase in the
quote, “our dramatic virtuosity,” which I take to be central in Chapter One of Word and
Object (to which I will proceed shortly). But first, it may be helpful to pause a moment
here and consider Quine’s analysis of translation in Chapter Two of this book. 
11 The first point I wish to make here is that Quine offers us a scientist – because the linguist
is  an  anthropologist  –  engaged  in  what  is  universally  recognized  as  the  “art” of
translation. There is thus a kind of science/art tension/fusion at work from the beginning
of his extended metaphor. Second, Quine’s choice of the imaginary indigenous word for
“rabbit,” “Gavagai,” is unnecessarily aesthetically pleasing – fun to say,  with a lilting
rhythm. Relatedly, his alternate descriptions and hypothetical translations of “Gavagai”
are also unnecessarily lovely,  from “momentary leporiform image,” to “an otherwise
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rabbitless sequence,” “rabbit-fly,” “a stage of a rabbit,” “an integral part of a rabbit,” “the
rabbit fusion,” and “where rabbithood is manifested” (Quine 1960: 31, 37, 52-3). Third, in
writing of “dispositions to assent,” Quine suggests “positions” and “positing,” which – as I
have explored elsewhere – are connected to dance (via posing) and poetry (via poiesis as
“positing” in Aristotle) of the theater (Quine 1960: 34).3 Fourth, although Quine speaks of
the scientist being able to eventually “bicker with the native as a brother,” neither Quine
nor his commentators attach significant to the issue of being bilingual, which I wish to
explore below (Quine 1960: 47, 74).  Fifth, Quine writes that the “method of analytical
hypotheses is a way of catapulting oneself into the native language by the momentum of
the home language,” and the necessarily approximate nature of catapulting is another
good example of an art/science hybrid (Quine 1960: 70).
12 To  clarify  these  points  further,  it  may  be  instructive  to  compare  the  post-Quine
development of the radical translation issue by Hilary Putnam in Meaning and the Moral
Sciences. The main points I wish to emphasize from the latter book are that (a) Putnam
uses artificial and alien lifeforms (namely a computer that produces speech patterns and
the Martian interpreters thereof), rather than a fellow human society (as Quine does),
and that (b) this correlates with Putnam’s more counterproductively rigid metaphysical
position there (in contrast to Quine’s floe/flow metaphysics) (Quine 1960: 38). 
13 The most important point to come out of this discussion in Putnam, as noted by (among
others) Rorty,  is Putnam’s notion of “the ‘interest-relativity’  of explanation” (Putnam
1978: 41; Rorty 2009: 26). Putnam illustrates this with the example of the pointlessness of
explaining – at a subatomic level – why a square peg will not fit in a round hole (Putnam
1978:  42).  In  making  this  point,  Putnam  explicitly  acknowledges  his  pragmatist
commitments, noting that he views “philosophy of science as normative description of
science,” which entails that “explanation has to be partly a pragmatic concept” (Putnam
1978: 42). Returning to the connection to his fellow Pragmatist, Putnam then modifies
Quine’s  “Gavagai”  thought  experiment  by,  first,  imagining  two  alternate  translation
manuals, using “rabbit” and “undetached rabbit-part,” respectively (Putnam 1978: 44).
Putnam uses this to extend Quine’s “indeterminacy of translation” to what Putnam terms
“an indeterminacy of reference” (Putnam 1978: 45). This second translation manual, and this
is the key, is geared toward the relative interests of the Martians, who (due in part to
their potentially smaller size relative to humans) find descriptions of “undetached rabbit
parts” more natural, useful, intuitive, etc. than descriptions of “rabbits.” 
14 The gist of this modification by Putnam, for my purposes here, is that it attempts to
undermine Quine’s conception of the indeterminacy of translation by couching the latter
within  the  determinacy of  the  biological  makeup  of  the  translators.  In  other  words,
compared  to  the  interspecies  translations  between  Martians  and  humans,  the
intercultural translations between the Western anthropologist and jungle tribal member
appear to rest on a fairly secure basis after all. But the cost of this move for Putnam is
that of leaving behind the only species we know scientifically to engage in translation,
and to abandon that firmer ground for the imaginary realms of intelligent Martians. In
this  way,  Putnam  moves  simultaneously  (a)  away from  reality  by  positing  a
supercomputer and Martians, and (b) toward a static, reified, hyper-solid metaphysics.
Quine, by contrast, sticks with humans, and stays in a floe-flowing middle path.
15 In other words, Putnam is only able to make intercultural translation seem reliable by
contrasting intercultural translation with fictional translation involving a computer that
we have been unable to design and an alien species that does not in fact inhabit the
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planet  Mars.  And the reason Putnam needs intercultural  translation to be reliable is
because the source of that reliability is the solidity and fixity of a mind-independent
objective world of things, about which different cultures (and more importantly, different
scientists)  may  communicate.  Put  differently,  a  close  observation  of  actual  human
translation (as offered by Quine)  reveals  it  to be much more fluid and creative than
commonsense takes it to be. And the only way to save commonsense (as attempted by
Putnam) is  to depart even further from it  and toward the realm of  pure fiction and
speculation. That is, Quine shows the seemingly ordinary to be a creative, imaginative
endeavor in this world, while Putnam can only shore up the ordinariness of the ordinary
by pretending temporarily to believe in something extraordinary but nonexistent. 
16 I turn now from these additional considerations inspired by Word and Object’s Preface to
Chapter  One.  My  translation  of  the  content  thereof  will  be  that  human  dramatic
virtuosity – including work in logic – turns on the following six primacies (or instances of
prioritization or positing):  (1)  physical  objects,  (2)  science,  (3)  sociality,  (4)  chaos,  (5)
simplicity and (6) familiarity. These six primacies can also be understood as constituting a
preview of the results of Quine’s subsequent investigation, and (more importantly for my
article) as the six pillars of Quine’s neo-Pragmatism.
17 First, Quine maintains that the first and most important things are physical objects, and
for the following reasons: “Linguistically, and hence conceptually, the things in sharpest
focus  are  the  things  that  are  public  enough  to  be  talked  of  publicly,  common  and
conspicuous  enough  to  be  talked  of  often,  and  near  enough  to  sense  to  be  quickly
identified and learned by name” (Quine 1960: 1). Physical objects come first because they
are public, common and near-to-the-senses. 
18 Contrarily, with regard to what has tended to dominate the materialists’ ontology, “Talk
of subjective sense qualities comes mainly as a derivative idiom” (Quine 1960: 1). Like a
good  Pragmatist-Aristotelian,  Quine  maintains  that  qualities  inhere  in  substances;
substances are not merely aggregates of qualities. Contrarily again, this time contrary to
the liquefied end of the Pragmatist metaphysics spectrum, “immediate experience simply
will not, of itself, cohere as an autonomous domain. References to physical things are
largely what hold it together” (Quine 1960: 2). Physical objects are more coherent, more
conceptualizable, than the pure flux or immediacy of experience. Quine thus makes use of
a pragmatic principle to reject positions in the neighborhood of Rorty and James.
19 But what of the past? Those on the contrary side, which is to say the idealist side, of the
Pragmatist spectrum of metaphysical systems (such as Brandom and Habermas), find the
memory of past events an essential part of reality, and one that undermines the primacy
of the physical objects currently in front of us. “[P]ast sense data,” writes Quine (1960:
2-3), “are mostly gone for good except as commemorated in physical posits.” The past is
only real as embodied in current relations to physical objects, and those relations are
merely relations of positing. And, what is even worse for the dignity of the long-ago, “a
memory trace of a sense datum is too meager an affair to do much good. Actual memories
mostly are traces not of past sensations but of past conceptualization or verbalization”
(Quine 1960:  3).  Here one finds an unexpectedly Proustian conceptuality of  the past.
Memories  are not  records  of  past  truths,  but  are present  fictions (poetically  suspect
interpretations) at work on past fictions. Again, all that one is left to rely on is the brute
immediacy of one’s stimulations, interpreted by recourse to the true fictitious positing of
physical objects.
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20 Science,  which is  second among these six primacies,  Quine (1960:  4)  defines as “self-
conscious common sense.” This is science’s ontology, and its language (its neologisms),
correspondingly,  are  “just  linguistic  evolution  gone  self-conscious”  (Quine  1960:  4).
Science is the becoming-aware of language, the coming to awareness of a fundamentally
dynamic  and  evolving  phenomenon.  But  this  self-conscious  evolution,  like  its
unselfconscious basis,  is  smooth and gradual,  not jarringly abrupt.  As Quine remarks
(1960: 4), “we warp usage gradually enough to avoid rupture.” Warping is thus the kind of
poetic  distortion,  the  kind  of  dramatic  translation,  native  to  science.  Borrowing
Wittgenstein’s famous metaphor, Quine (1960: 4) suggests that, “we may kick away our
ladder  only  after  we  have  climbed  it.”  Again  one  finds  (this  time  Wittgensteinian)
Pragmatism at the conclusion of Quine’s analyses.
21 Quine then explicates this position as follows: “No inquiry being possible without some
conceptual scheme, we may as well retain and use the best one we know – right down to
the latest detail of quantum mechanics, if we know it and it matters” (Quine 1960: 4). As if
the theater of life were not already uncertain enough, one now finds that the stage is not
really a stage, that where the wooden planks of the floor would be, there are instead a
plethora  of  wooden ladders,  each supporting  various  actors  who cling  to  them,  and
occasionally climb or jump from one ladder to another, kicking away the ones no longer
needed, but always holding on to at least one. “Analyze theory-building how we will, we
all must start in the middle” (Quine 1960: 4). Every actor is on a ladder, and no one can
see how far down the ladders go, or where their base is, if there is any base at all. This
reference to Wittgenstein and this concession to Pragmatism at the conclusion of Quine’s
analysis  raise  the  question  as  to  how all  of  this  analysis  of  science  relates  back  to
philosophy.
22 “[P]hilosophy in turn,” writes Quine (1960: 4), “as an effort to get clearer on things, is not
to  be  distinguished  in  essential  points  of  purpose  and  method  from  good  and  bad
science.” Therefore,  by logical replacement of identical terms, one could characterize
philosophy, too, as self-conscious commonsense; its terminology, too, as the product of
self-conscious linguistic evolution; its method, too, as a poetic distortion of reality; and its
governing principle, too, as that of James’ pragmatic conception of truth – namely, “do
what works.”
23 Quine’s third primacy is sociality.  “Society,  acting solely on overt manifestations,  has
been able to train the individual to say the socially proper thing in response even to
socially undetectable stimulations” (Quine 1960: 5). In other words, the social cues that
determine our linguistic behaviors are so powerful that each fully-trained actor reacts to
the cues even when those cues are imperceptible to the others. Fortunately, as an actor,
one moves beyond this  automatic,  robotically-programmed linguistic  behavior,  which
Quine renders poetically as the “the fancifully fancyless medium of unvarnished news”
(Quine 1960: 10). One moves beyond such behavior, specifically, because it is not in a
human being’s dramatic nature to rest with prosaic reporting, with knee-jerk responses.
“We  cannot  rest,”  Quine  (1960:  10)  adds,  “with  a running  conceptualization  of  the
unsullied stream of experience; what we need is a sullying of the stream.” The difference
suggested  in  this  last  quote  is  between  an  attempt  at  automatic,  faithful,  factual
recordings of experience, on the one hand, and intentionally strategic, poetic creations of
experience, on the other. This creation of experience is a community activity, extending
to each person, as both a society-created member and also a society-creating member of
society. It is a view of human beings as essentially artist-scientists.
Logical Theatrics, or Floes on Flows
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
6
24 Underneath language as social ordering, it turns out, lies a more fundamental chaos, and
this  chaos  is  Quine’s  fourth  primacy.  “Beneath  the  uniformity  that  unites  us  in
communication there is a chaotic personal diversity of connections, and, for each of us,
the connections continue to evolve. Not two of us ever learn our language alike, nor, in a
sense, does any finish learning it while he lives” (Quine 1960: 13). Various actors have
lines in common, but are they thinking and feeling the same things when they deliver
those lines? Their different dramatic renditions would suggest that there are differences
in thought, feeling, intent, purpose, etc.,  but there is,  again, no objective measure by
which to confirm that seeming.
25 Even the building blocks of these linguistic behaviors, according to Quine, are less clear-
cut and more chaotic than one tends to imagine. “What counts as a word, as against a
string of two or more, is less evident” according to Quine (1960: 13) “than what counts as
a sentence.” It is only where words are distorted into sentences that one has greater
clarity. “In the case of words it is a contrast between learning a word in isolation – i.e., in
effect,  as a one-word sentence – and learning it  contextually,  or by abstraction,  as a
fragment of sentences learned as wholes” (Quine 1960: 14). Naturally, the first strategy
works better for concrete words, especially for physical objects, while the second strategy
is necessary for abstract words, and there is a hierarchy for the two. 
26 “What  makes  insensible  [abstract]  things  intelligibly  describable,”  Quine  (1960:  14)
continues, “is analogy, notably the special form of analogy known as extrapolation.” One
distorts  one’s  concepts  of  physical  objects  into  abstract  concepts;  one  extrapolates
physical  objects into abstractions;  and the physical  basis  is  that to which everything
returns. Words “mean only as their use in sentences is conditioned to sensory stimuli,
verbal and otherwise” (Quine 1960: 17). These sentences, in turn, as sonic phenomena, are
also sensory stimuli, which means that they too are capable of making words mean – a
phenomenon that Quine poetically renders as “the interanimation of sentences” (Quine
1960: 18).
27 Quine’s fifth principle, simplicity, is the one that is always at work resolving this chaos
into the order previously considered. Considerations of simplicity, he explains, “in some
sense may be said to determine even the least inquisitive observer’s most casual acts of
individual recognition” (Quine 1960: 19). Simplicity is therefore not one principle among
many, or one that operates on occasion, but the governing principle of order, and one
that is constantly in process. As Quine (1960: 19) puts it, “a law of least action remains
prominent among [the observer’s] guiding principles.” 
28 Simplicity  has  three  corresponding  powers  in  the  method  or  process  of  science/
philosophy.  First,  “Observation  serves  to  test  hypotheses  after  adoption;  simplicity
prompts their adoption for testing” (Quine 1960: 19). Observation only becomes relevant
for hypotheses initially adopted on conceptually economic grounds. Second, the power of
simplicity boosts the power of the hypotheses that it chooses by making it more extensive
in its applications. “One incidental benefit of simplicity that can escape notice is that it
tends to enhance a theory’s scope – its richness in observable consequences” (Quine 1960:
20).  Third,  simplicity  helps  keep  any  given  theory  alive  to  its  connections  to  other
theories and to the fundamental nexus of practice/reality. The “simpler a theory, the
more easily we can keep relevant considerations in mind” (Quine 1960: 20).
29 Quine’s sixth and final primacy is a natural and logical consequence of simplicity, namely
familiarity. “Familiarity of principle,” he claims, “is what we are after when we contrive
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to ‘explain’ new matters by old laws” (Quine 1960: 20). Going with what is familiar is a
way of simplifying things, and it guides us in the process of extrapolation from physical
things  to  abstract  things,  from  abstraction  to  abstraction,  and  even  from  physical
reactions to physical objects. “Considered relative to our surface irritations,” Quine (1960:
22) continues, “which exhaust our clues to an external world, the molecules and their
extraordinary ilk are thus much on a par with the most ordinary physical objects.” In
other words, our method of creating abstract object such as molecules is not different in
kind from our “creating” physical objects from an aggregation of physical responses to
physical stimuli.
30 Quine then summarizes these six primacies. First, “What reality is like is the business of
scientists,  in  the  broadest  sense,  painstakingly  to  surmise”  (Quine  1960:  22,  emphasis
added). Quine distorts artists, poets and even people in general into scientists. Second,
“surmising what reality is like” is ultimately an artistic, groundless activity, not one that
admits of indubitable “scientific” progress (Quine 1960: 22). We “have no reason,” he
claims, “to suppose that man’s surface irritations even unto eternity admit of any one
systematization that is scientifically better or simpler than all possible others” (Quine
1960: 22). (Notice also how closely Quine links “better” to “simpler.”) “Scientific method,”
next, “is the way to truth, but it affords even in principle no unique definition of truth”
(Quine 1960:  22).  And even Pragmatism’s  truth fares  no better  in this  indeterminate
process,  since any “so-called pragmatic  definition of  truth” for  Quine “is  doomed to
failure equally” (Quine 1960: 23).
31 The bottom line, or “saving consideration,” for Quine (1960: 24) is that “we continue to
take seriously our own particular aggregate science, our own particular work-theory or
loose total fabric of quasi-theories, whatever it may be.” In other words, all we have is our
poetry, and that based on the social poetry of previous generations, but we all agree to
believe in it, to pretend that it is not poetry, and so we all get along for the most part and
get by.
32 I now turn from Word and Object to two other brief pieces by Quine, in order to buttress
my interpretation of him as a neo-Pragmatist. Beginning with “The Pragmatists’ Place in
Empiricism,” it begins with insults to the label “pragmatist,” and then chalks up whatever
is good in thinkers labeled as such to “empiricism.” The rest of the essay is a list of the
five  improvements  that  empiricism  has  undergone,  accompanied  by  the  (so-called)
Pragmatists’ relationship to those five points. The points are as follows: (1) “the shift
from ideas to words,” (2) “the shift of semantic focus from terms to sentences,” (3) “the
shift of semantic focus from sentences to systems of sentences,” (4) “abandonment of the
analytic-synthetic dualism,” and (5) “naturalism” (Quine 1981: 24).
33 As  for  the  Pragmatists’  relationship  to  these  points,  Quine’s  evaluation  is  distinctly
ambivalent toward all  the classical Pragmatists.  For example,  he mocks James for his
“notorious defense of  wishful  thinking,” but then praises him (and Dewey) for being
“decidedly naturalistic in their way of doing epistemology” (Quine 1981: 32, 35). Quine’s
most  purely  positive  evaluation,  surprisingly,  is  of  F. C. S. Schiller.  Specifically,  Quine
celebrates Schiller’s “doctrine of ‘postulation,’ which had us believing whatever we wish
were true until it proves trouble” – because, for Quine, “scientific theory is man-made”
(Quine 1960:  32,  33).  The Pragmatists’  most original  contribution according to Quine,
however, can be traced to George Herbert Mead, via Mead’s student Charles Morris. To
wit, Morris “chose the word ‘pragmatics’ for the behavioral end of the study of language”
(Quine 1960: 37).  Quine describes this innovation, along with “the doctrine of man as
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truth-maker,”  as  his  “two best  guesses”  as  to  the “shared and distinctive  tenets”  of
Pragmatism, in which orbit he squarely places himself.
34 As for the implications for Quine’s status as a neo-Pragmatist, counter-intuitively, it is
this very ambivalence about pragmatism that most closely identifies him with it. One has
only to think of  any of  the three classic  Pragmatists  to  notice that  all  had tortured
relationships  with  pragmatism.  James  popularized  one  view  using  its  name,  which
prompted  Peirce  to  abandon  that  name  for  a  modified  version  thereof,  and  Dewey
explicitly  preferred  other  labels  despite  his  obvious  debts  to,  and  sympathies  with,
Pragmatism’s two founders. That is to say, it appears to me that a thinker’s willingness
and  ability  to  recognize  fluidity  and  differences  within  other  thinkers  labeled  as
Pragmatist,  rather  than  condemning  them  wholesale  via  some  caricatured
oversimplification, constitutes positive evidence of pragmatism in that thinker. In short,
a Pragmatist is someone who approaches other Pragmatists pragmatically. And this is
exactly what Quine demonstrates here. 
35 Turning  to  the  second  brief  text  from  Quine,  his  “Reply  to  Morton,”  one  can  find
pragmatism as  well  in  Quine’s  rejection  of  Morton’s  attempt  to  make  “emotions”  a
separate  source  (along  with  “sensations”)  of  verification  of  Quine’s  “observation
sentences” (Quine 1987: 663). Quine rejects this suggestion in a way that, at first, seems to
denigrate the emotions. That is, he disqualifies them from serving as corroborators of
observation sentences,  on  the  grounds  that  they  require  too  much  “collateral”
information (in addition to the present stimulus). In other words, sensation can produce
unanimous  assent  or  dissent  in  the  moment,  whereas  emotion  requires  much  past
information as well. But this, ultimately, is a clue to Quine’s pragmatist truth, which is
that at least one value (namely truth) into which the emotions tap is part of the warp and
woof of inquiry itself. Thus, “normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the
technology of truth-making” (Quine 1987: 664-5). 
36 Put differently, value cannot serve in the infantry of inquiry (alongside sensations with
observation  sentences),  because  it  is  inquiry’s  general.  Truth-seeking  constitutes  the
spiritual cables that suspend disciplined knowledge above the turbulent waters of a world
in flux – not because truth-seeking – and for Quine, this always means truth-making as
well – is mixed into inquiry, but because inquiry’s truth-directedness means that its fibers
are  always-already  truth-oriented,  and  thus  (at  least  in  that  respect)  always-already
ethical. And on this note of truth-making-seeking, I now turn to Mercer.
 
II. Oh [Philosophically] Inverted World!
37 In this section, I will consider the poem that is the first song from The Shins’ first album,
Oh, Inverted World! – “Caring is Creepy.” I will analyze this poem using the Quinian neo-
Pragmatism elaborated in my previous section. What emerges from this analysis will be a
performance of philosophy as freaking out in the face of life, in the wake of which one
moves toward a Pragmatist acceptiance of the semi-stable ice floe on the underlying flow
of reality (or the theater as shelter of poetic constructions from the turbulent outside
world). But first, I will preface my Quinian translation of “Caring is Creepy” with two
broad considerations about Mercer’s work.
38 First, Mercer’s poems (qua the lyrics to The Shins’ songs) exist primarily as technological
recordings  of  popular  music,  played  sometimes  on  the  radio  but  more  often  on  CD
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players,  MP3  players,  etc.  These  are  his  poetry’s  primary  media,  and  they  are
performative and repetitive  ones.  Relating this  back to  the overarching trope of  my
article, logical theatrics, one could say that the radio, CD player and MP3 player are all in
a way personal theaters, and that when played on them, The Shins’ music constitutes a
kind of private theatrics. This extension of the theater into the home and for private use
is of course a logical extension of Western technological virtuosity. It makes sense that
music,  along  with  the  rest  of  Western  culture,  would  be  subjected  to  technological
production and commodification.
39 Secondly, as a preview of “Caring is Creepy,” and for a concise demonstration of Mercer’s
resonance with Quine, consider the following passage from “Fighting in a Sack,” from the
Shins’ second album, Chutes Too Narrow: “to keep this boat afloat well there are things you
can’t afford to know so I save all my breath for the sails.” The metaphor for society here,
a boat, is a structure built for locomotion, not a secure dwelling on a permanent ground,
which suggests the chaotic basis of Quine’s human world (and the floe/flow metaphor for
Quine’s moderate Pragmatist metaphysics). The passage also suggests that certain truths
about this world need to be ignored, that we improvise in order to distort away certain
things on a dramatic scale, echoing Quine’s translation as distortion. Finally, the motive
that the passage attributes to these distortions is a thoroughly practical one, entirely
sympathetic with Quine’s neo-Pragmatism. We seek to keep the boat afloat in the chaotic
seas, so we distort our knowledge of the world, and save our energies for that which
keeps our boat sailing along. Here, in just one sentence, the Shins articulate Quine’s (a)
chaotic basis, (b) method of distortion and (c) moderate Pragmatist metaphysics. 
40 The  title  of  the  primary  song  under  consideration,  “Caring  is  Creepy,”  could  be
referencing the fact that one of  the arguably most pervasive of  all  human emotions,
namely  care,  has  come  to  seem  unnatural.  This  discomfort  with  emotionality  is  a
commonly criticized trend in much traditional  Western philosophy;  it  has frequently
been alleged (by Wittgenstein among others) that philosophy constitutes a semi-willing
self-alienation from life out of a fear of its inevitable uncertainties and pains. In other
words, one could translate philosophy into a being “freaked out” in the face of life. 
41 The orientation of the poem (that is, as song lyrics), insofar as the poem is written in first
person and addresses an informal “you,” works much like the monologue of dramatic
poetry  such  as  Shakespeare’s  plays.  This  conception  of  dramatic  monologue  also
resonates with the dramatic elements of Quine’s Word and Object, in which the “natives”
and Western  “jungle  linguist”  play  vital  performative  roles,  and according  to  which
reference can only be established and clarified through translation – by the trespassing
from one speaker to another, whether between or within a human body.
42 I now proceed to a consideration of the entire poem, line by line.
“I think I’ll go home and mull this over”
43 The song begins with the subject I, the ego, reflecting on the fact that it is about to begin
reflecting.  The  verb  here,  according  to  the  American  Heritage  College  Dictionary,  is
etymologically derived from “[prob. ME moillen, mullen, to moisten, crumble].” Another
denotation it lists for “mull” is “to heat and spice (wine, for example)” (895). Thinking in
English is thus a kind of heating, spicing, moistening and crumbling. And philosophy is
nothing if not reflecting.
“before I cram it down my throat”
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44 Presumably unintentionally, Mercer stays true to the Middle English referent of “mull”
with the song’s first bit of colorful phrasing. After moistening and crumbling whatever
“it” is (we never find out for sure), the speaker intends to cram it down his throat. This
line also resonates with Quine’s colorful description of his hypothetical bilingual “jungle
linguist” who “deals observably with the native informant as live collaborator rather than
first  ingesting  him”  (Quine  1960:  71).  One  imagines  that  Quine  would  applaud  the
speaker’s plans for some pre-digestion rumination.
“at long last it’s crashed, the colossal mass
has broken up into bits in my moat.”
45 Notice, still from “mull,” the crumbling that happens to the colossal mass. I would argue
that this couplet refers to the confrontation between the universality of ideas and the
particularity of  the contemplator,  necessitating the dramatic change in the universal
“substance” for it to be absorbed by the particular speaker of the poem.
“lift the mattress off the floor”
46 Here the mattress, essential equipment for sleep, is lifted out of its place. The possibility
for  sleep  is  denied  to  someone  whose  mattress  was  already  not  in  the  place  most
conducive to restful sleeping, a bed. Physicality is pushed back for the colossal mass of
abstract reflection. Similar neglecting of physicality is one of the defining features of
Quine’s analytic brethren (at least from the perspective of many of their critics).
“walk the cramps off”
47 The thinker’s  body has been neglected for the sake of  thought,  so much so that the
muscles have begun to cramp from atrophy. Philosophically exercising the muscles of the
brain is not sufficient to prevent cramping.
“go meander in the cold”
48 When physicality is finally allowed to occur, in the walking, it immediately becomes a
meandering, “mov[ing] aimlessly and idly without fixed direction,” motion disconnected
from  practical  purpose.  The  speaker  encourages  someone  to  move  around  like  the
speaker thinks: aimlessly and idly, and in the cold, in an atmosphere devoid of warmth –
warmth being the totem state of healthy mammalian physicality.
“hail to your dark skin”
49 The ratiocinating speaker of the poem draws attention, for the first time, to a descriptive
quality of the person being addressed – dark skin – which summons connotations of the
imperialist white male (as the lead singer, Mercer, is in fact a white male) addressing
subaltern populations of color. This also reminds one of the discriminatory connotations
of Quine’s figure of the “primitive jungle natives.”
“hiding the fact you’re dead again”
50 Death is perhaps the most enduring gift of the white Western male to the black Eastern
female. For writing and rationality, à la Derrida, are always directed to death. And though
“a hero dies once,” as the saying goes, “the coward [philosopher] dies many times in one
lifetime.”
“underneath the power lines seeking shade
far above our heads are the icy heights that contain all reason”
51 In the first  of  these two lines,  the ineffectualness of  refuge from the burning eye of
Reason is invoked,  or the non-consolation of traditional Western philosophy,  lines of
power channeling surging currents,  and too thin to protect something like skin from
something like excessive sunshine.
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52 In  the  second line,  perhaps,  is  the  song’s  climax.  The abstract  objects  of  traditional
Western philosophical  rationality  are always-already out  of  our reach and cold from
lifelessness.
“it’s a luscious mix of words and tricks
that let us bet when you know we should fold”
53 Notice the change here in from philosophical  critique of  philosophy to philosophical
solution to  philosophy,  from diagnosis  to  prognosis  and prognostication.  Poetry  and
Pragmatism, unlike traditional Western philosophy, make life possible, although they do
so through somewhat obvious tricks of aestheticizing and conceding to (basely) practical
motives. The result: a Jamesian betting on life once more, an existential commitment,
based on the beauty of the way things sound the world.
“on rocks I dreamt of where we’d stepped”
54 Having  foregone  the  mattress,  the  speaker  has  taken  to  sleeping  on  that  most
uncomfortable of human sleeping surfaces: rocks. Or perhaps s/he just dreams awake.
Either  way,  s/he  dreams  about  stepping,  and  thus  about  walking,  and  dynamic
physicality.
“and of the whole mess of roads we’re now on.”
55 Things have gotten tangled since the stepping started. But life is like that, full of tangles.
“hold your glass up, hold it in”
56 The truth in wine, the pervasiveness of repression, respectively.
“never betray the way you’ve always known it is.”
57 Stick to your irrational upbringing, your instincts, the principles that defend you from
thought, doubt and despair. With Quine, all theory is theorizing-in-the-middle and doing-
the-best-we-can-with-what-we’ve-got, because, after all, what else can we do?
“one day I’ll be wondering how”
58 It begins in wonder, said Aristotle.
“I got so old just wondering how”
59 It  ends  in  wondering  about  wonder,  about  its  beginnings,  the  poem’s  speaker  adds.
Reality  may  be  circular,  but  one’s  hair  turns  gray  only  once,  and  before  one  dies.
Philosophy has made the speaker of the poem almost die from getting old wondering.
“I never got cold wearing nothing in the snow.”
60 Traditional Western philosophy and its rationality find life irrelevant. They don’t notice
the cold, perhaps because their natural element is abstract frigidity?
“this is way beyond my remote concern”
61 Apathy: the emotion of traditional Western philosophy as practiced, for example among
the Stoics.
“of being condescending”
62 Elitism: the hallmark of traditional Western philosophers as practitioners, for example in
Plato and Aristotle’s aristocratic tendencies.
“all these squawking birds won’t quit.”
63 The philosophers do tend, one must admit, to go on for thousands of pages.
“building nothing, laying bricks.”
64 All the philosophers “lay” (because historically it is neither many sexual partners, nor
bricks for a house) are metaphorical pieces of excrement. 
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65 The song then repeats from “hold your glass up” all the way to its end. Thus, despite
having just mocked philosophy for its voluminous verbiage to no clear advantage, Mercer
then continues to hoist the philosophers’ torch, albeit in his own musical way. Despite the
laying of “bricks,” the listener is exhorted again to raise the glass, to move ahead and
renew  the  cycles  of  life,  despite  having  discovered  the  fecal  foundation  of  any
thoroughgoing rational and logical attempt to understand reality. 
66 Notice  that  it  is  not  any  specifically  poetic  feature  of  this  poem  that  makes  it  so
challenging  to  translate.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  the  poem’s  philosophical  qualities,
principally its abstraction, which lends the song to vague and fuzzy analyses. Also, like
much academic philosophy, it assumes familiarity with things that the listener is unlikely
to recognize or understand. Lacking any such helpful cues, people tend to simply go with
what works, with what is most familiar, with what is simple and suits their practical ends
– in this case, since we are talking about popular music – enjoyment, the pleasure of
listening.
67 But  say  that  a  particular  listener  were  interested  in  something  else.  Say  that  the
pragmatic impulse was toward wisdom, toward getting a better handle on the world. Such
being the  case,  and such being the  guiding motive  for  my article,  does  it  make my
analyses  more  illegitimate  than  other  possible  translations  of  the  song?  Does  the
propensity of contemporary Western culture to interpret pop songs as love songs make a
romantic reading of the song truer, and if so, why? Why may I not stand on indeterminate
ground and offer my own poetic distortions of Mercer’s poetry, and why may I not find
philosophy in the “icy heights that contain all reason?”
68 Quine observes that, “Reflective persons unswayed by wishful thinking can themselves
now and again have cause to wonder what, if anything, they are talking about” (Quine
1960: 242). Of course the listener is entitled to wonder – and to wonder if Mercer is not,
after all, writing about philosophy. Is he not, perhaps, like so many other young men of
his generation, disenfranchised with Western academic philosophy? Perhaps Mercer does
see in philosophy a “freaking out” in the face of life, an unhealthy fear that makes caring
“creepy.” And perhaps he does see a solution in affirming the “luscious mix of words and
tricks,” that make life exciting and fulfilling,  in lifting one’s  “glass up,” and even in
singing about bird droppings.
69 Perhaps  some  readers  will  concede  that  my  translation  of  Mercer  into  Quine  is  as
plausible as any other (i.e., is for Quine as permissible as any other theory). Why, one
might wonder, should one think that Quine and Mercer make a particularly appropriate
ordered  pair?  To  buttress  these  Quinian  translation hypotheses,  I  will  now consider
multiple points in Quine’s work that naturally fit with Mercer’s poetry. I will begin with
From  a  Logical  Point  of  View,  followed  by  a  return  to  “The  Pragmatists’  Place  in
Empiricism,” and conclude with a brief stylistic survey of The Shins’ four studio albums.
70 The first essay in From a Logical Point of View, “On What There Is,” uses the phrase “allergic
to meanings,” (Quine 1980: 12) and Mercer writes of being “allergic to love” (“Know Your
Onion!”).  In  both  cases,  the  rejection  of  an  abstraction  is  figured  in  reductively
physiological terms; that is, rejection of an idea is a matter of the body’s rejecting it –
naturalism triumphs. 
71 Secondly, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” offers the following two interesting moments of
alliance: (a) Quine claims that “judgment turned out to be a will-o-the-wisp,” (Quine 1980,
32) while Mercer rights of “too many good intentions / held by clever sprites” (“Red
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Rabbits”); and (b) Quine refers to a “metaphysical article of faith,” (Quine 1980, 37) while
Mercer  writes  that  “though the saints  dub us  divine in  ancient  fading lines  /  Their
sentiment is just as hard to pick from the vine” (“Saint Simon”). 
72 Third, “Logic and the Reification of Universals” includes the following three moments: (a)
“a  torrent  of  universals  against  which  intuition  is  powerless”  (Quine  1980:  123)
comparable to “ideas that can’t help / but creep good people out” (“Pressed in a Book”);
(b)  the  mathematical  conceptualist  as  “squeamish”  (Quine  1980:  127)  comparable  to
“Most ideas turn to dust / As there are few in which we all can trust / Haven’t you noticed
I’ve  been  shedding  all  of  mine?”  (“Fighting  in  a  Sack”);  and  (c)  the  mathematical
nominalist easing his “puritanic conscience” by comparing himself to the “lotus-eating”
Platonists (Quine 1980: 129) comparable to “You are not some saint who’s above, / Giving
someone a stroll through the flowers” (“Girl Sailor”). 
73 Fourth, “Reference and Modality” notes that “nonsense” “can always be remedied by
arbitrarily assigning some sense,” (Quine 1980: 150) while Mercer writes of “the nursery
rhymes that helped us out in making sense of our lives” (“Saint Simon”). 
74 And finally, “Meaning and Inference” claims that logic “presumed to a certain degree of
creativity,” but that its artifice “is a good one,” comparable to the following lines from “A
Comet Appears” in conjunction with the subsequent lines from “Young Pilgrims” and
“Sleeping Lessons”:
Every post you can hitch your faith on
Is a pie in the sky
Chock full of lies,
A tool we devise,
To make sinking stones fly
Of course I was raised to gather courage from those
Lofty tales so tried and true and
If you’re able I’d suggest it ‘cause this
Modern thought can get the best of you.
And if the old guards still defend,
They got nothing left on which you depend,
So enlist every ounce of your bright blood,
And off with their heads.
Jump from the book,
You’re not obliged to swallow anything you despise,
75 Altogether then, Mercer’s poems rearticulate (in their own idiom) Quine’s insights that
(a) our ideas are pragmatic fictions, which are (b) good and worthy as long as they serve
our pragmatic purposes,  and thus (c)  prudent to abandon and replace when they no
longer thus serve.
76 Returning to Quine’s “The Pragmatists’ Place in Empiricism,” both the five points in the
evolution  of  empiricism,  and  also  the  reasons  for  Quine’s  self-identification  as  a
Pragmatist, align nicely with Mercer as well. The five points align as follows, 
77 (1) Mercer affirms “words” over “ideas,” noting the “impact” of the former and their
useful combination with “tricks” (while ideas “creep good people out,” “turn to dust,”
and are “vague” and un-relatable).  (2)  Most of  the individual words in the lyrics are
literally meaningless outside of their context in the lines and sentences of the songs. (3)
Similarly, most of the lines and sentences are meaningless outside of the entire songs, of
the songs that make up an entire album, and even of their entire four-album oeuvre. (4)
Mercer mocks a priori truth claims (the “icy heights that contain all reason”) in favor of
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empirical investigation, (“Under the rocks are snails and we can fills our pockets / And let
them go one by one all day in a brand new place”). And (5) as Mercer writes, “the trick is
just making yourself.”
78 As for Quine’s self-identification as Pragmatist, consider the following lines from Mercer’s
“Port of Morrow” (title track from The Shins’ latest album):
Under my hat it reads
The lines are all imagined. 
A fact of life
I know
To hide from my little girls.
I know my place amongst
The bugs and all the animals.
79 That is, like Quine, Mercer simultaneously affirms (a) truth as human-made/imagined,
and (b) the objective truth or reality of that making, the pragmatic implication of which
is to remember his objective place in the naturalistic world of the animal kingdom.
80 Finally in terms of supporting evidence for Quine and Mercer’s singular compatibility,
there are significant isomorphisms of style between Quine and Mercer. For example, if
one combs carefully  through all  four  of  The  Shins’ studio albums,  the following four
patterns emerge. First, in sympathy with Quine’s allusions to Neurath’s bootstrap (which
compares language to a ship that can only be repaired at sea), there are five references to
“boats” in a similar tenor (including “turn this ancient boat around,” “keep this boat
afloat,” “if your’re a seascape I’m a listing boat,” “an emptier boat” and “an upturned
boat”), thirteen references to the “sea,” and four to the “ocean.” Moreover, there is a
marked  preference  for  the  sea  as  a  means  of  travel  compared  to  the  sky  (where
everything is unreachable, and ends up crashing anyway). Second, in terms of Quine’s
famous “Gavagai”/rabbit example, there are five instances of the word “rabbit” in the
songs. Third, Mercer shares Quine’s fixation on math, including references in the songs to
“multiplying,”  “quotients,”  “algebra,”  “adding  it  up,”  “subtraction,”  geometric  “lines
dissecting love,” and “measuring,” as well as multiple references to numbers abstracted
from any  concrete  context.  Finally,  both  Quine  and  Mercer  engage  in  effective  and
enjoyable  self-deprecating  humor  (including  being  “allergic”  to  meanings/love
respectively).
 
III. Theatrical Flowing Conclusion
81 To  summarize  the  above  analyses,  by  “logical  theatrics,”  I  mean  the  following:  (1)
theatrics which follow logically (i.e., from the nature of reality); (2) theatrics inherent in/
as  the  nature  of  logic;  (3)  logic  as  the  sub-discipline  of  philosophy;  (4)  logic  as  the
transcendental law of thought; (5) logic as logos as discourse; (6) theatrics as the essence
of the theater; (7) theatrics as over-dramatic human behavior; and (8) theatrics as human
nature  qua  dramatic.  Quine’s  discourse,  on  these  terms,  is  a  theatrically-accented
discourse about the necessary theatrics of logic as it enacts the theater of the world.
Mercer’s discourse, on the same terms, is a theatrically based logic of reality as the drama
of discourse. Quine’s thought is a logical consequent of the theatrical world, while
Mercer’s thought is the chronologically logical theatrics of Quine’s logic, and mine is the
logical and over-dramatically theatrical blending of these logical theatrics and theatrical
logics.
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82 In other words, Quine and Mercer’s logic is the posited theater, the solid poetic artifice
sheltered against the historical evolution of society. To follow in the roles of Quine and
his commentators,  one could picture this as a variation on the “Gavagai” translation
script. My own attempt in the present article could thus be understood as a new, triadic
translation, namely between Quinian, Mercerian, and my own language, which one might
call “Reconstructish,” the language of we who live in the tumultuous wake of Rorty’s big
three (Dewey, Heidegger and Wittgenstein) and their followers (including Rorty himself).4
That is,  instead of merely translating a new indigenous language into one’s own (like
Quine’s anthropologist), I have attempted to translate two different languages into a third
for the benefit of the speakers of the latter and the rest of our shared globe.
83 The significance of this overlapping theme in Quine and Mercer can be illustrated by
recourse to the aforementioned Neurath’s bootstrap, in that the “ship of self” (Mercer)
and the “ship of science” (Quine) must be repaired “at sea.” To contextualize this point in
relation  to  the  variety  of  contemporary  Pragmatist  metaphysics  and  philosophies  of
language, Quine and Mercer make logic flow, not all the way to liquefying it, but rather
like an ice floe, a sheet of ice floating on the water beneath. The floe and the flow are of
the same watery substance, and any molecule above could just as well have been (or
become)  a  molecule  beneath;  but  one  can  travel  on  the  floe  because  the  current
arrangement  is  stable  enough as  it  is.  This,  then,  is  what  makes  Mercer  and  Quine
singularly suited for each other. They both posit that a reality understood as posited is
enough to have something worthy of the word reality.  And in so doing,  they offer a
Pragmatist middle way between Pragmatist total liquefying (as in Rorty’s conversation
melted to pure whimsy)  and Pragmatist  total  freezing (as  in Habermas’  conversation
reified into scientific object). 
84 Although  I  am  merely  a  humble  translator,  whose  own  sympathies  lie  more  (like
Bernstein) with Dewey and Mead (and who is most at home speaking Reconstructish) I
can step back from philosophical partisanship and look in a naturalistic spirit to two
contemporary issues in regard to which Quine/Mercer’s position has much to offer. To
wit,  (a)  the  literal  ice  on  our  waters,  such  as  the  polar  ice  caps,  are  melting  into
undifferentiated ocean as part of the tragedy of global climate change, and (b) our poetry
and theaters are disappearing into the flow of mass market culture and cinema. The
connection I find is that Quine and the Shins help pull us back from both total liquidizing
and elitist rigor mortis – keeping the theater inside the world, our floe navigable on the
flow. Put differently, we cannot survive in undifferentiated water without a handhold or a
place to rest our bodies, nor can we survive of dehydration in castles of unyielding ice.
Similarly, no livable world can be reified into, à la Shakespeare, “but a stage” (as suggested
by, among other things, so-called “reality” television), nor is life worth living in a world
where all  vestige of  the shelter  of  the theater  and poetry have been liquidated into
consumer consumption.
85 To return again to my titular metaphor, the present article has attempted to stage a new
encounter between Quine and Mercer for the audience of my readers. The upshot of this
performance is that, for Quine and Mercer, we need neither a reduction of structure to
pure logic-less mess, nor a special elevating of one narrative (physics for Quine, perhaps
elegy for Mercer?), but rather a pragmatic humbling of science and an elevation of art
into a new fusion: a stable, disciplined Wissenshaftkunst – a Nietzschean “gay science” of
poetry. Armed with this scientific art, perhaps more Anglo-American philosophers can be
persuaded to abandon their ice castles and join our Reconstructish sea-battle – using
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logical creations strategically to save the arts (including the theater and poetry) and even
the Earth itself (from global climate change).5
86 Less ambitiously, one might hope that Quine translated as a moderate, neo-Pragmatist
metaphysician can do for Pragmatism (intra-Pragmatically) what Pragmatism does for
Anglo-American philosophy (extra-Pragmatically),  namely offer a persuasive style and
rhetoric for those most tightly in the clutches of the kind of philosophical rigor mortis
that dominates mainstream, ahistorical Anglo-American philosophy. Within Pragmatism
itself, the symptoms of this are visible when Pragmatists such as Habermas talk about
“facts” and “how things are.” This is analogous to trying to fit the world into a theater
that forgets its metaphysical origins and structure lie in artifice.
87 In any event, there is significant benefit to be had merely in noting that even someone
like  Quine,  located  in  the  middle  of  this  Pragmatist  metaphysical  spectrum,  can  be
translated effectively into the work of a popular poet such as Mercer. Moreover, this
unholy alliance already begins to suggest Quine’s own blending of the arts and sciences
(and Mercer’s frequent invocation of scientific fact in his poetry). Together, these two
philosopher-poets  marry  aesthetically-rich  scientific  hypothesizing  to  scientifically-
disciplined artistic  creation.  In  short,  Quine and Mercer  help show us  that  beautiful
science, rigorous art, and philosophy truly in the world can still save the latter. So let us
take up our theatrical true logics, and join the good fight.
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NOTES
1. For recent, more orthodox interpretations of Quine’s Word and Object, see Pagin 2008, and Rayo
2002.
2. This  position  is  based  on  Myers’  undergraduate  course  entitled  “Pragmatism,”  held  at
Birmingham-Southern College in the spring of 2003.
3. See Hall forthcoming.
4. The  reader  uncomfortable  with  thinking  of  Quine’s  oeuvre,  or  Mercer’s  (let  alone  my
invention) as a language, should perhaps consult Davidson’s “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,”
regarding his claim that there is no such thing as a “language” separate from the sum total of the
sentences asserted by speakers thereof (Davidson 2005: 107).
5. This  is  where,  I  would  argue,  Rorty  goes  wrong  in  his  analyses  of  Quine  as  a  scientistic
reductionist (for example, Rorty 2009: 155). To wit, Rorty equivocates between the following two
dichotomies: (a) logic, math and “hard” science versus every other discourse, with (b) disciplined
inquiry (inclusive of science, technology, the arts, etc.) versus disorganized experience. If Quine
is interpreted as advocating (b) rather than (a), then he can understood as being on board with
Rorty’s own advocacy of disciplined inquiry in both the arts and sciences (for example, Rorty
2009: 339, 344-5).
ABSTRACTS
This article investigates a philosopher and a poet who initially appear to occupy opposing ends of
the traditional spectrum from prosaic conceptuality to poetic immanence. The philosopher is
twentieth century United States philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine, one of the central figures
in the most prosaic tradition of the history of Western philosophy: so-called analytic or Anglo-
American  philosophy.  The  poet  is  James  Mercer,  lead  singer,  guitarist  and  lyricist  for  the
contemporary  “Independent  rock”  band  The  Shins,  and  as  such  is  intimately  bound  to  that
allegedly most shallow and unthinking type of all Western music: popular rock and roll. In brief, I
will argue that both Quine and Mercer suggest a theatricality at the heart of logical thought and a
logic of the theatrical – in other words, a logical theatrics. Or, to put it in terms of a spectrum of
Pragmatist metaphysical positions (from pure process to naïve realism), Quine and Mercer offer
neither a pure flux in which logic is dissolved, nor a timeless logic that freezes all life from the
world, but rather an ice floe of logic on which to navigate the flows of experience.
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